Some Iranians May Welcome Military Strike

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With the election of pro-mullah regime candidate, Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, I figured it was only a matter of time before the war in Iran starts. Part of the reason I voted for Bush in this past election was because I wanted Washington to harshly confront Tehran (and Damascus for that matter) and given the choices I had, I figured the "devil I knew" would get the job done. However, I've lost a lot of faith in Don Rumsfeld's ability to properly plan a war and I've lost even more faith in the American people's ability to understand why we're at war in the first place. So between bad planning and the population not having the stomach nor the capacity for rational understanding, I began to change my stance. I've backed away from calling for military intervention in Iran because of fears that it will be just like the war in Iraq. Mostly I feared that the people of Iran would revolt against us as the Sunni's have in Iraq. In my opinion, it just wasn't worth it.

I have called, at least once a week, for internal regime change in Iran via popular revolution. I've called for CIA assistance with reform movements on the ground in Iran itself rather than a full-scale invasion. However, I've been reading this article from the Worldtribune.com, which suggests that because of the recent election victory by the hardliners, maybe, just maybe the Iranian people might welcome a military strike.

"Apart from polarizing Iranian-Western relations, the election of Ahmadinejad also helped further polarize political feelings within Iran. Defense & Foreign Affairs sources inside Iran — sources who have unfailingly reflected the underlying mood of the population in the past — reported on June 25, that there was a feeling inside the country that would welcome even a U.S. military strike against Khamenei as a trigger to allow a popular uprising. This is a new sentiment inside Iran. Until now, the feeling has been that Iranians could and would handle the change of power in the country. Now, with Ahmadinejad, the feeling was that the suppression of political opposition inside the country would rise from the draconian to absolutist if the clerical leadership could possible achieve it." (Read More)

If this is true then it changes the complexion of how I feel we should engage Iran going forward. If there can be coordination between a strike against their nuclear capabilities and a catalyst to start a revolution against the mullah's in the streets, then I say that sounds like a plan. It would be even better if we could get their military to stand down against us and help the reformists. There's some slight indication that, that endeavor is indeed possible.

"Throughout this, the one internal group which has retained its honor in the eyes of the Iranian public has been the Armed Forces, even though the Armed Forces leadership is politically appointed and answerable to Khamenei. Now, while the Ahmadinejad Administration begins seeking out and destroying internal political leaders, it cannot yet risk dismembering or neutering the Armed Forces — particularly if there is the chance of a military confrontation with the U.S. — and this leaves the Armed Forces and Pasdaran units potentially able to confront the clerical rulers." (Read More)

Now some reading this might consider this view still too hawkish and I'll receive a litany of comments stating that, "war is never the answer" or something about deliberation rather than engagement. I would like to agree with those sentiments but it does take two to create peace and while this administration may have sinister goals in mind in consideration of the Middle East, it doesn't help that the Iranian mullah's aren't exactly extending the olive branch to us either.

The article goes on to say that, "Tehran is determined not to risk such an attempt to decapitate the Iranian nuclear/strategic weapons capability and command and control, even when it is likely that such a strike would not fully destroy either the weapons capability or the command and control mechanism/leadership. Instead, Tehran is considering the capitalization on the U.S.-Israeli threat as the justification for a unilateral escalation of the war-by-proxy with the U.S. in order to force a strategic decision through a myriad of terrorism and insurgency. Moreover, while it is likely that the U.S. would insist that Israel remain militarily uninvolved in such a strike, for fear of triggering a broader Muslim-Israel conflict. It seems clear from a reading of available indicators that Iran intends to make the destruction of Israel, rather than a confrontation with the U.S. in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, the primary objective of the regional eruption.

Thus, unless there is a U.S./Israeli strike, Iran would refrain from directly striking at Israeli targets and U.S. regional targets, including basing facilities in Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, and elsewhere. Instead, Iran would escalate activities of the myriad of Islamist-jihadist groups inside Iraq (both Shi'a and Sunni), and may even move militarily to enter parts of Iraq (either to protect Shi'ites in distress and/or strike at the support infrastructure for the Khuzestan insurgents). It would also escalate activities with regard to Iraq from Syria, and move to consolidate/secure its grip on power in Syria. This may also include the initiation at this stage, or later, of Hizbullah assets in Lebanon against Israeli targets, including the unleashing of major missile attacks from the Bekaa against Israel and launching a spate of major terrorist attacks at the heart of Israel by Iran-sponsored Palestinian groups in the PA.

Since Israel would retaliate against such attacks, Tehran would be able to present the regional conflagration as Islam's jihad against U.S.-Israeli presence in the region and for the establishment of true Islamic regime throughout the Middle East. Given the existing radicalization and incitement throughout the Middle East, there would be a groundswell of support for such a jihad to the point that most Arab governments would have no choice but join the jihad or risk violent overthrow."

I think I've made my stance on this clear. Your thoughts?